Antonio Murphie <themurph@xxxxxxxxxx> espoused:
>
> "Robin T Cox" <nomail@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
> news:tO1ij.14842$O01.1249@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> On Sat, 12 Jan 2008 10:06:02 +0000, Roy Schestowitz wrote:
>>
>>> Security design: Why UAC will not work
>>
>> Principal reason: one of the first things Vista users want to do is to
>> switch UAC off.
>>
>
> You are obviously another "advocate" who is incapable of reading. Here...
> let me supply the part of the article that was conveniently snipped.
>
> [QUOTE]
>
> It's security's dirty little secret: Not having your users logged in as
> ROOT or administrator will not stop malware.
Not if you're on a Windows platform, perhaps, but it works very well on
Unix, Linux, BSD, VMS and so on.
> There is a huge public security thrust to ensure that users are not
> constantly logged on with highly privileged access. In Microsoft Windows,
> this means not being logged in as a member of the administrators group or
> any of the other 17 groups with admin-like privileges (for example, Power
> Users).
17 groups... gods, no wonder there are problems.
> In Unix/Linux/BSD, this means not being logged in as root or bin or
> whatever else is close. In the AS/400, it means not being logged in as
> Qsysop or Qsecofr. For mainframes, it might mean superuser, terminal 0, or
> another user label indicating special privileges.
>
> [-QUOTE]
>
The fact remains that Vista users detest UAC so much that they want to
switch it off.
For a good security model, look at Ubuntu or maemo (Nokia 770,800,810)
platforms. They have incredibly easy package management with no need to
ever become root. This is a major advantage for Linux users.
--
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