Roy Schestowitz wrote:
> The short life and hard times of a Linux virus
>
> ,----[ Quote ]
> | For a Linux binary virus to infect executables, those executables must
> | be writable by the user activating the virus. That is not likely to be
> | the case. Chances are, the programs are owned by root and the user is
> | running from a non-privileged account. Further, the less experienced
> | the user, the lower the likelihood that he actually owns any
> | executable programs. Therefore, the users who are the least savvy about
> | such hazards are also the ones with the least fertile home directories
> | for viruses.
> |
> | [...]
> `----
>
> http://librenix.com/?inode=21
An old link but a good one...
The biggest single reason is that the technical measure, such as those
quoted above, have the following effect:
[Quote]
A computer virus, like a biological virus, must have a reproduction rate
that exceeds its death (eradication) rate in order to spread. Each of the
above obstacles significantly reduces the reproduction rate of the Linux
virus. If the reproduction rate falls below the threshold necessary to
replace the existing population, the virus is doomed from the beginning --
even before news reports start to raise the awareness level of potential
victims.
[Unquote]
There are a number of technical reasons for this "herd immunity", including
the diversity of the Linux software, security models based on Unix concepts
such as su/sudo, central repositories for most software, and other reasons.
The technical details, however, are just that, details, and the key element
is the replication rate of malicious software.
That's what is crucial for a virus, including a computer virus, the
replication rate; while a *single* Unix-like box might be targeted[*];
however Unix-like systems such as Linux as a general class have an
effective "herd immunity" against automated viruses and malicious software,
protecting the population as a whole.
[*] at least individually by a human hacker, anyway
--
JPB
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